Everyone knows that sound
A ☕️☕️☕️ read in six parts.
I.
There is a movie poster for Open Range that I keep returning to, not entirely sure what I’m looking for when I go back.
The image is simple. Kevin Costner’s cowboy stands silhouetted against a barn, a gun held forward into the light, the weapon luminous against the shadow of his body. Behind him, barely visible, the suggestion of a town worth protecting. Ahead of him, at the far edge of the frame, a line of riders coming to kill him. And beyond the riders, beyond the threat and the violence and the earthly muck of the whole confrontation, a horizon—vast, open, suffused with a light that has nothing to do with gunfights. The tagline: No place to run. No reason to hide.
I know what this image is doing. I have spent enough time with the history of the mythology, with the scholars who have traced its genealogy from the colonial moment through the dime novel through the Hollywood Western through the Supreme Court chambers where men who watched too much Gunsmoke decided what the Constitution meant—I know the icon and its operations and what it costs the people it was never designed to protect. I know all of that. And when I look at the poster, I still feel the pull.
It arrives first as nostalgia. A wistfulness for a childhood where the good guys and the bad guys were clearly defined, where the reluctantly armed man standing on principle had a sharp clarity to it, where the moral universe organized itself around a single silhouetted figure and you knew exactly where you stood in relation to him. Something in me still lives in that childhood, still responds to the image with a recognition that is older than my critical education and more stubborn.
But when I stay with it longer, the nostalgia gives way to something else. The image is not only backward-looking. It has the formal structure of a Caspar David Friedrich painting—the lone figure at the edge of the known world, the sublime horizon beyond the immediate conflict, the sense of standing at the threshold between the earthly and something infinite that has not yet been encountered. The cowboy is not just an artifact of an idealized past. He is oriented toward a future. The horizon behind the threat is open, terrifying, full of a light the violence cannot account for. He is going somewhere, and the gun is not the destination—it is the passage.
I once found that image aspirational. The grief of the world-weary knight, still called out to do battle with one more monster, once felt like a form of nobility—the promise that if you would take up the burden and fight for the good, the inevitable end was not merely exhaustion but a kind of fulfillment. The stoic tired champion with his trusty weapon: this was the shape a man’s life could take. Open Range, like so many mythological works of art, affirmed that the grief was real and the fulfillment was real and the two arrived together, inseparable.
I do not want that identity anymore. I want to be honest about that, and honest about what honesty costs. The wanting is gone—not suppressed, not refused under duress, but genuinely relinquished, through a process I will come to later in this essay, a formation that broke something open in me and left me standing differently. I do not want to be the stoic gunslinger. I do not want to hand that mythology to my son. I know too much about what the image is carrying, whose bodies were on the wrong side of the gun it promises, what story I would be entering if I stepped into the silhouette and called it home.
But the sadness I feel when I look at the poster is not the sadness of a man who found something better and cleaner on the other side of the refusal. It is the sadness of a man who gave up a clarity he is not sure he has replaced. The icon organized something. It threw the silhouette into sharp relief—this is who you are, this is what you stand for, this is the shape your life makes against the light. Without it, I find myself more in the position of Friedrich’s figure seen from the front: standing at the edge of a sublime and overwhelming horizon, the infinite stretching out in every direction, the earthly bearings dissolving, the self ill-defined against the openness. It is not a bad place to stand. It may even be the right place to stand. But it is not the place the poster was promising, and I would be lying if I said I never feel the difference.
Willie James Jennings writes that those of us who have angled our lives to teach and preach and write against violence often fail to recognize the aesthetic and community-forming power of weapons—their beauty, their seductive pull, their capacity to organize desire and identity and belonging.1 He is right, and the failure he names is not intellectual. You can know the history of the gun and still feel what the gun promises. You can refuse the mythology and still grieve the clarity it provided. The icon does not release you simply because you have decided to refuse it. It stays in the body, doing its work, long after the mind has made its choice.
This essay is an attempt to understand what that work is, and what it costs, and what it means to be a man who is still—after everything—not entirely free of the sound.
II.
The house where I grew up from eight to eighteen sat at the rural edge of a county that was still mostly farmland, in a subdivision where everyone had at least an acre and the woods pressed in close on most sides. Our backyard ended at a creek, and beyond the creek was someone else’s tobacco field. My parents both worked nearly an hour away—my father on alternating night shifts for the transportation department, my mother as a transcriptionist at a hospital. Our time together at home was limited during the weeks, and when I think now about what it must have felt like to leave a family in a house at the edge of the woods and drive an hour into the night, I start to understand the provisions they made for us.
My parents still lock the door behind you when you come to visit. It’s not a gesture—it’s a reflex, and it tells you something about the disposition that ran through the household I grew up in. Not paranoia. Something more like clear-eyed attention to the gap between what you love and what the world might do to it. My father is the kind of man who looks at a situation and identifies what could go wrong and make arrangements—a trait I am grateful to have learned from him. The arrangements were not dramatic. They were practical, unglamorous, specific to the actual shape of the threat. A bat in the low cutout along the floor behind their bed. A knife tucked away on the headboard. Martial arts—years of it, a body trained for the kind of distance a bat required.
And at some point, a shotgun.
I don’t remember the make or model. I was always scared of it, and my father didn’t treat it as anything more than a perceived necessity, which meant I had no occasion to get past the fear toward familiarity. He took my mother out to the tree line to practice—loading shells, learning the weight of it, the recoil. She wasn’t particularly keen to keep up the practice. I don’t think she was meant to love it. She was meant to know it, which is a different thing. My father was making arrangements again, trying to close the gap between what he could provide while present and what she would have available while alone.
The shotgun lived for a while in a small cutout in the floor behind their bedframe. Not a rack, not a case, not anything that announced itself. A hiding place that was also a reach-away—tucked under the lip of the bed, accessible in the dark without rising, without crossing a room. When my sister was old enough to crawl, it disappeared. I’m not sure where it went. The provisions shifted as the household shifted. Nothing was permanent except the attention behind them.
But I’ll never forget the sound.
The pump action on a shotgun makes a sound that is almost impossible to describe to someone who has heard it, because they already know what you mean, and almost impossible to describe to someone who hasn’t, because no description is adequate. My father, who did not speak dramatically about most things, said once: I don’t even have to load it. Someone breaks in and you pump that gun, he’s going to get out as fast as he can. He said it the way he says most things—plainly, as a report on the world rather than a performance for it. The gun’s primary purpose was acoustic. He was keeping a sound.
What I didn’t understand then and have spent some years understanding since is why the sound works. It works because everyone knows it. And everyone knows it because they have been formed, by a culture older and wider and stranger than any single family or county, to respond to that particular sequence—the chunk-chunk of shell chambered, mechanism cocked, weapon made ready—with the knowledge that what comes next will be final. My father was right that he didn’t have to fire it. But the sound’s power was not his. He had borrowed it from somewhere else, drawn on a cultural reserve he hadn’t built and didn’t entirely control. The shotgun deterred because the mythology preceded it.
I was scared of the gun. I want to be careful about why. It was not my father I was afraid of—he is measured and careful, a man whose provisions are expressions of love rather than power, and nothing about the way he kept the shotgun suggested otherwise. The fear was about the object and what it was for. About its immensity. A bat requires your body to already be in the same room as the threat. A gun reaches through walls, across yards, into the dark beyond the tree line. It extends what a man can be responsible for beyond what his body alone could cover. That extension was what frightened me.
But underneath the fear of the object was another fear that I did not have language for at eight or twelve or fifteen and am only now finding words for. The culture had already told me that a gun was proper to a man’s hand. The Western mythology—the poster I would not yet encounter but had already in some sense absorbed—had already established that there would be a moment, a threshold, when I would need to be the kind of man who could hold one and use it. And I looked at my father’s shotgun in its floor cutout and felt the question forming. When will my hand have to hold this. Will I be able to. What if I’m not. What if I don’t want to be.
This is not a question my father asked me to ask. He said almost nothing about the gun except that one line about the sound. He was making provisions for his family, not making claims on his son. But the mythology had arrived in the house before the shotgun did, and it asked the question whether he intended it to or not. The son is always watching the father’s hands, reading them for information about what his own hands will eventually be required to do.
Jennings identifies a trinity as formative of American life as any other: the father, the son, and the gun.2 He doesn’t mean this casually. He means that the transmission of masculine identity in this country has been structured around the weapon the way other transmissions are structured around other shared objects—the meal, the book, the practice. The gun as the thing passed from the hands that know it to the hands that are learning. The gun as the site where a boy learns what is expected of him.
My father and I never had that transmission. He didn’t put it in my hands. He kept it in the floor. He moved it when my sister could crawl. He treated it as a perceived necessity and nothing more, which was, I think, a form of grace—a refusal to let the icon do more work than the provision required. But the question the icon was already asking could not be refused so easily. It had arrived before the gun. It would remain after the gun was gone.
I am still working out what to do with it.
III.
Before my father bought the shotgun, the shotgun had a history. Before it arrived in the floor cutout beside his bed, it had been traveling toward that moment for centuries, carried in the hands of men who were building something and protecting something and claiming something—and the mythology that made my father’s deterrent work, that made everyone know that sound, was the same mythology that had been doing that work all along.
This is what I did not know as a boy and have been learning since: that you cannot inherit a cultural object without inheriting the story it was already telling. The shotgun was not neutral. No gun ever is.
Jennings traces the genealogy carefully. From the beginning of the colonial moment, gun culture formed within dreams of masculinity bound to land ownership—a dual possessive gesture that structured everything that followed: this is my land and this is my gun. The two belong together in this logic, each one requiring the other. The land needs the gun to remain land—possessed, bounded, defended. The gun needs the land to remain legitimate—purposeful, protective, rooted in something worth defending. Masculine identity formed in the new world at the junction of these two possessions, and the man who held both was the man the culture called complete.3
This dynamic is older than the Western. Kelly Brown Douglas traces it further back, through Tacitus’s Germania, through the Puritan covenant theology that made the new world a promised land requiring conquest, through the doctrine of Manifest Destiny that gave that conquest divine sanction. The Anglo-Saxon myth—a people exceptional by nature, ordained to expand, entitled to defend their expansion with force—is not American in origin. It arrived on these shores already formed, already knowing what it was for, already telling its story about whose ground could be stood upon and whose body could stand on it.4
But ideology requires victims, and Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz names them. In Loaded: A Disarming History of the Second Amendment, she makes the specific historical argument that the Second Amendment was not primarily legislation for individual self-defense or frontier adventure. It was enabling legislation for two specific forms of organized violence: slave patrols in the South, and militia operations against Indigenous peoples on the expanding frontier. The “well regulated militia” that the Second Amendment protects was not protecting homesteaders from outlaws. It was clearing land—Indigenous land—so that the dual possessive gesture could be completed. This is my land required, as its precondition, that the land be taken from someone. Dunbar-Ortiz names who. The frontier mythology romanticizes what was in historical fact a war of dispossession, and the gun was its primary instrument.5
The Western genre is the transmission system that turned this history into mythology. Richard Slotkin spent three massive volumes demonstrating what most Americans feel without being able to articulate: that the frontier myth is America’s foundational story, that the violence of that myth is not incidental but central, that regeneration through violence—the idea that the self is purified and renewed through its encounter with the savage, the threat, the wilderness—is the deepest structure of American identity.6 The Western hero is the figure who knows when institutions have failed and law cannot reach and the individual man with the gun is all that stands between civilization and chaos. He reluctantly draws. He solves what the law cannot. He walks back into the sunset alone, having done what was necessary, having remained clean in the doing of it. What he has done, in historical fact, is dispossession. What the myth calls it is heroism.
Malcolm Gladwell, in a 2023 podcast series on gun mythology, found the transmission system working in a specific and verifiable way. The fictional Dodge City of Gunsmoke—the most popular television show in American history, running for twenty seasons across three decades, watched by tens of millions—had a homicide rate eighty times higher than the real Dodge City of the 1870s. The real Dodge City had a sign at the bridge coming into town: The carrying of firearms strictly prohibited. Visitors checked their guns at the sheriff’s office. The cattle-town lawmen Wyatt Earp and Bat Masterson were, in historical record, aggressive gun control advocates. None of this made it into Gunsmoke. What made it into Gunsmoke was a Dodge City where violence was perpetual and legitimate authority was weak and the individual man with the gun was the only reliable instrument of justice. The show taught its lesson with the regularity of liturgy, season after season, decade after decade, until the lesson wasn’t a lesson anymore—it was simply how things were.7
Gladwell makes a point that should be more disturbing than it tends to register: the Supreme Court justices who wrote the majority opinion in D.C. v. Heller, establishing an individual right to bear arms as constitutional bedrock, were operating from a historical understanding of the American West that was closer to Gunsmoke than to the actual historical record. The mythology had migrated into jurisprudence. The fiction had become the ground on which real law was decided.8
This is what the community-forming power of weapons actually looks like at scale. The gun doesn’t just protect. It teaches. It passes on a way of understanding the world—who is the threat, who has the right to stand their ground, whose presence requires the ready hand. The mythology is not neutral about these questions. It never was.
Barack Obama asked the question that reveals the mythology’s load-bearing structure. Following the acquittal of George Zimmerman for the killing of Trayvon Martin, Obama said at a White House press briefing: if Trayvon Martin had been of age and armed, could he have stood his ground on that sidewalk?9 Kelly Brown Douglas, writing as both theologian and mother of a Black son, makes this the center of her analysis. The answer the culture gave—the answer the law gave—was no. Stand Your Ground was not written for Trayvon Martin. The doctrine of the man entitled to defend his ground against the threat approaching him encodes, in its very structure, a prior judgment about which bodies are the threat and which bodies are the ones with ground worth standing. The mythology that made my father’s sound work is the same mythology that made Trayvon Martin’s presence read as danger.10
I want to sit with that for a moment before moving through it, because I think it’s possible to receive it as a political point and miss it as a formation point. The mythology is not simply unjust—it is formative. It has been making people into a particular kind of person for centuries, telling them what to fear and what to protect and what a man looks like when he is doing his job. My father’s provisions drew on that formation without his consent or full awareness. So did mine. The sound of the pump-action works on me too—I feel it, the low-voltage alarm, the animal recognition—and I did not choose to be formed that way. The formation was completed before I was old enough to examine it.
My father is a careful and loving man making provisions for his family. He is also a man who had been formed by a story older than both of us, and the story had opinions about what protection looked like and who needed protecting and what a man held in his hand when the moment came. He didn’t know the full history of what he was borrowing. Neither did I. Neither, I suspect, did most of the men who passed the mythology along—fathers to sons, screens to living rooms, pulpits to pews, decade after decade, until everyone knows that sound and no one remembers learning it.
That’s how formation works. That’s what makes it dangerous. And that’s why the question of what you hand on to your son is never a simple question. You are never handing on only what you intend. You are handing on everything the story has already put in your hands.
IV.
Ida B. Wells carried a gun.
This is not a footnote to her legacy—it is close to the center of it. After three of her friends in Memphis were lynched in 1892, killed not for the crime the mythology required but for the crime of running a grocery store that outcompeted a white-owned one nearby, Wells documented the pattern no one wanted documented and published the analysis no one wanted published. A white mob destroyed her newspaper office in response. She was out of town. She did not go back.
What she wrote in the aftermath is worth sitting with: A Winchester rifle should have a place of honor in every Black home, and it should be used for that protection which the law refuses to give.11
Notice what she is not saying. She is not saying guns are redemptive. She is not saying the armed individual is civilization’s last defense. She is not standing in front of a barn with the weapon held forward into the light, promising something. She is saying something colder and more precise: the law has declared itself unavailable to you. The institutions that exist to stand between the vulnerable and the threat have determined that you are not the vulnerable—you are the threat. Given that specific abandonment, given that specific situation, what do you have left?
The Winchester in Wells’s argument is not an icon. It is what remains after every icon has failed.
This is the distinction the mythology collapses and the essay has been working toward: the icon and the provision are not the same thing. The icon promises sovereignty—the man alone against the chaos, the body that extends its authority outward through the weapon, the self that is completed by the thing held in its hand. The provision is different in kind. It asks nothing about sovereignty or completion or the fulfillment of masculine destiny. It asks only: when the state will not protect you, what do you have? It is a question born not of fantasy but of abandonment. And the answer Wells gave—unglamorous, clear-eyed, specific—was the Winchester.
My father’s provisions were closer to this than to the poster. The shotgun in the floor cutout was not performing anything. There was no mythology being inhabited, no version of self being completed. There was a man calculating what his family would have available in the dark when he was an hour away, drawing on what the culture had given him to draw on, trying to close the gap between what he owed them and what he could provide. He was not Costner silhouetted against the barn. He was a man on a night shift hoping the sound would be enough.
But here is what I have to say honestly, from where I actually stand: I cannot fully inhabit Wells’s argument. I can understand it. I can recognize its force and its necessity. I can see that it is not the mythology in different clothing but something genuinely different—a refusal of helplessness rather than a performance of power, a last resort named clearly as a last resort. But I cannot claim it as mine, because the abandonment she was writing from is not the abandonment I have experienced. The state has not organized itself against my body. The law has not declared itself unavailable to me. My nonviolence—the principled refusal I will come to in the next section—costs something real, but it does not cost what it would cost a Black woman in Memphis in 1892, or a Black man in Minneapolis in 2026.
Alex Pretti was legally carrying at a protest in Minneapolis on January 24, 2026, when he was shot ten times in under five seconds by U.S. Border Patrol agents.12 He was doing exactly what the Second Amendment mythology says the good man with a gun does—present, lawful, positioned to protect. The myth said his weapon made him legitimate. The state said his body made him the threat. The Gun Owners of America defended him. The Trump administration called him an assassin. Sean Illing, in a conversation shortly after, noted what the Pretti case revealed: that the Second Amendment is tribal rather than principled, that its protections have always been administered with a specific body in mind, that the moment a Black man exercised the right the mythology claimed was universal, the mythology declined to show up for him.13
This is Obama’s question made lethal. If Trayvon Martin had been of age and armed, could he have stood his ground on that sidewalk? The answer the culture gave Trayvon Martin is the same answer it gave Alex Pretti. The provision Wells was pointing to—the gun as what remains when the state declines to protect you—remains necessary for the same reason it was necessary in 1892, because the state is still declining in the same directional way. The Pretti killing is not a historical data point. It is present tense.
So where does this leave a man like me, trying to think clearly about what he hands on?
I cannot hand on the myth. The myth is a lie—about history, about the West, about whose ground can be stood and whose body is the threat. The myth has been doing damage for centuries and I will not pass it to my son in the name of formation. That refusal is real and it is mine.
But I cannot dismiss the provision as illegitimate either, as though the people who need it most should be satisfied with my principled distance from it. Wells needed the Winchester. Pretti exercised his legal right and was shot for it. There is a version of nonviolence that functions as a luxury available to the people the state has decided to protect—a principled position made affordable by the very arrangement that makes it unaffordable for others. I do not want that version of nonviolence. I do not think it is actually nonviolence. I think it is comfort wearing the clothes of conscience.
What I am left with is a distinction I cannot fully resolve and am trying to be honest about: the icon belongs to a mythology I refuse, and the provision belongs to a situation I do not fully inhabit, and the space between those two things is where the essay is standing. Not a tidy position. But an honest one.
V.
I came to seminary late, at twenty-five, leaving another graduate program behind. I was not new to church—I had grown up inside it, knew its rhythms and its language, had a faith I would have called genuine. But I was new to the deeper ends of the theological pool, and I did not know how deep the water went until I was already in it.
My new wife and I were helping lead a church plant, young and earnest and excited in the way that people are when they are building something together and have not yet learned how much can go wrong. And into that season arrived a set of teachers who were doing something I had not seen done before: taking Jesus seriously. Not seriously as in solemnly, not seriously as in rigidly—seriously as in, if this story is true, then almost everything else has to be reconsidered in its light. Stanley Hauerwas. Will Willimon. Willie James Jennings. Fleming Rutledge. Marva Dawn. I was being introduced to a Christianity that was more demanding and more coherent than anything I had encountered, and the coherence was what got me. I had always suspected that faith might ask more than it had been asking. Here, finally, was the more.
What Hauerwas did—what the whole tradition he was drawing on did—was teach me to see the resurrection as a political claim. Not metaphor, not consolation, not private spiritual experience. A claim about the structure of reality: that death is not the final word, that the logic of redemptive violence has been broken at its root, that the story ends differently than the myth says it ends. If God raised Jesus from the dead, then the thing the gun promises—resolution through force, the self preserved by its capacity to threaten—is not just morally wrong. It is cosmologically incoherent. It operates from a story that the resurrection has already interrupted.14
I had never heard it framed that way. And when I heard it framed that way, something happened that I can only describe as recognition—not of something I had known before, but of something I had dimly suspected was possible, a consistency and seriousness that faith had always seemed to be reaching toward without quite arriving. Oh, I thought. This is what it actually asks. And then, almost immediately, following behind the recognition like a shadow: this means the gun can never be mine.
Not that it had been. I had not carried one, had not been on the verge of carrying one, had not been making provisions the way my father made provisions. But the possible identity—the one the poster was promising, the one the boy standing in his parents’ doorway had wondered if he would be adequate to—had been alive in me in the way that possible identities live: as a question still open, a door not yet closed. Hauerwas closed the door. Or rather, the resurrection closed the door, and Hauerwas helped me see that it had.
The loss was specific and real. Not the loss of a practice or a possession but the loss of a shape. The stoic world-weary champion, the tired knight called out for one more monster, the man whose grief and resolve and willingness to stand between the innocent and the threat gave his life its silhouette—that figure had organized something in me, had thrown my sense of self into sharp relief against the light, had promised that if I would take up the burden the identity would be clear. And now it was gone. Not taken by force, not argued away, but dissolved by a claim about what had already happened on a Sunday morning outside Jerusalem. The resurrection turned out to be incompatible with the gun, which turned out to be incompatible with the silhouette, which turned out to have been doing more organizational work in me than I had known.
What I found on the other side of the dissolution was not a cleaner and better-defined identity. I found the Friedrich horizon—the sublime and terrifying openness, the self ill-defined against the infinite, the clarity of the silhouette replaced by something more like weather. I am still standing in that horizon. I have not resolved it into a new and satisfying shape. The refusal was real and it was right and I would make it again. But it cost the clarity, and the clarity had been something, and pretending otherwise would be its own kind of dishonesty.
My father and I have talked about this. It has never been contentious between us, which is its own kind of ache. He receives my theological nonviolence the way a loving father receives a son’s academic enthusiasms: as something the education afforded, an interesting position available to those with the leisure to hold it, not necessarily something more fundamental than that. He does not say this unkindly. He is not dismissing me. He is a man who made provisions in a floor cutout for his family’s survival in the dark, and from where he stands, the resurrection may look like a less serious engagement with reality than a pump-action shotgun.
I cannot fully correct him, and I am not sure I should try. He is not wrong that the position costs me less than it would cost someone the state has actually abandoned. He is not wrong that there is a version of principled nonviolence that functions as a luxury, a comfort wearing the clothes of conscience. What he cannot see—what I cannot make him see—is that for me it was not a position adopted from a distance but a ground shifted underfoot, a possible self dissolved, a door closed on something I had been moving toward without knowing it. The Hauerwas formation was the most disorienting thing that ever happened to my sense of who I was.
The gun was never in my hand. The mythology was always in my body. Hauerwas got the mythology. What replaced it is still being worked out.
VI.
My son is ten years old, and the mythology is already in him.
He wants Nerf guns. He wants to battle it out in the yard, to ambush his friends from behind the fence, to feel the satisfying chunk of the trigger and the arc of the foam dart and the clean uncomplicated joy of the thing. At the community pool in summer he is ruthless with a water gun, laughing, entirely alive, the weapon in his hand nothing more than pleasure and light. He knows we won’t buy the foam darts. He finds this deeply unreasonable, a parental failure on par with the most tragic deprivations of childhood, evidence that his mother and father have lost the plot entirely.
What I tell him is this: we don’t own guns, and we’re not okay with them in any form, and we don’t want to pretend that pointing a gun at someone can ever be a game worth playing. He receives this the way a ten-year-old receives a cosmological argument—with the particular combination of frustration and pity reserved for adults who have clearly missed something obvious. All his friends are doing it. It looks like play from inside it. He cannot see what I’m protecting him from, because the mythology looks like summer from where he’s standing.
We did watch The Mandalorian together, though. All of it, the two of us, over a stretch of evenings I remember fondly even now. And I have thought about what we were watching.
Din Djarin is the sorrowful gunslinger in his purest contemporary form—the lone armed man bound by a code, the helmet as literal icon, identity so complete that removing it feels like exposure. This is the Way. He lives inside the Creed the way the poster’s cowboy lives inside the silhouette: defined by it, organized by it, the shape of his life made legible by the thing he carries and the rule that tells him when to carry it. He is world-weary and competent and entirely alone, which is what the mythology has always said the real man finally is.15
And then the child arrives. Grogu—unchosen, inconvenient, impossibly small—and the Creed has nothing to say about him. The code that organized everything does not cover this. What the child requires is not a man who knows when to draw. It is a man who knows how to stay. And Din Djarin, slowly, over seasons, becomes that man—at the cost of the helmet, the Creed, the clean silhouette of the identity he had built. He lays it all down for the foundling. The mythology gets undone by love.
Except it doesn’t, not entirely. He keeps getting pulled back. The armor goes back on. The gun is still there. The show is honest enough to know that you cannot simply walk out of a formation that deep—that the man who chooses the child over the code still has the code in his hands, still knows how to use it, still finds the world requiring it of him. The tension doesn’t resolve. It continues.
I watched all of this sitting next to my son, who wanted Nerf guns and found my refusal baffling, and I thought: he is watching the mythology be honest about itself. He is watching the gunslinger get undone. He may not have the words for it yet. But he is seeing a man choose the child, and seeing what that choice costs, and seeing that the man keeps making it anyway. That is not nothing. That might even be formation.
And I am not entirely sure I can explain it to him yet—the full weight of why we hold the line on the foam darts, why the pretending matters, why the gun is never just a game. The explanation requires him to have lived longer inside the thing I’m asking him to refuse. You cannot hand on a reckoning to someone who hasn’t yet accumulated what needs reckoning with. What I can do is hold the line and hope that what he sees when he watches me hold it is something worth inheriting—not the rule but the reason behind the rule, not the refusal but the man doing the refusing and what that man is made of.
What he sees when he watches me, I honestly don’t know.
This is the thing about formation that the mythology never admits: it happens in the dark, in the gap between what the father intends and what the son receives, in the space between the hand that reaches out and the hand that takes. My father kept the shotgun in the floor cutout and took my mother out to the tree line to practice and said once, plainly, that he didn’t even have to load it—and I received all of that as love and provision and a question I wasn’t sure I could answer. He was not trying to transmit the mythology. He was trying to protect his family. What I received included both, indistinguishably, the provision wrapped in the story the culture had already told about what provisions looked like.
I have tried to hand on something different, even if only by a few degrees. I have tried to refuse the icon while honoring the provision, to refuse the gunslinger’s silhouette while keeping what was real in my father’s arrangements—the love that makes itself responsible, the willingness to stand between the vulnerable and the threat, the refusal to look away from what the world might do to the people you are trying to protect. Whether I am succeeding I cannot tell. The formation is still happening. My son is still ten. The gap between what I’m reaching toward and what he’s receiving is not yet visible to either of us.
What I know is this: the gun is still there. Not in my house, not in my hands—but there, just at the edge of the light, at the boundary between the shadows and the open country beyond. I look at the poster and I still feel the pull of what it promises. I still carry in my body the reflexes the mythology installed before I could object. I still hear the echo of a sound I may or may not have actually heard, in a house at the edge of the woods where my father was trying to close the gap between what he owed his family and what he had available to provide. The sound is still doing its work. Everyone knows that sound. I know it too, and knowing the history of it has not made me unhear it, and I expect I will know it for the rest of my life.
What the resurrection gave me was not a new silhouette. It did not replace the stoic gunslinger’s clarity with a different but equally defined shape. What it gave me was a claim about what had already happened—that the story ends differently than the myth says it ends, that death is not the final authority, that the logic that makes the gun necessary has been interrupted at its root. That claim dissolved the possible identity, closed the door on the figure I might have become, left me standing in the Friedrich horizon with the infinite opening out in every direction and no clean line to stand on.
I am still standing there. I am standing there in front of my son, who watches me the way sons watch fathers—reading the hands for information about what his hands will eventually be required to do. And what I want to hand him, what I am reaching toward even from inside the unresolved openness, is not the silhouette but the man inside the silhouette, trying to be honest about the grief and the refusal and the cost. Not the gun. Not the myth. Not the icon or its promise or the clarifying violence that makes the horizon legible.
Just the standing. The honest, ill-defined standing. The refusal to leave even though the gun is there, just over there, at the edge between the shadows and the light, still beautiful, still offering what it has always offered.
My father kept the sound. I am keeping the keeping—the love that makes itself responsible, the willingness to remain, the provision that does not require the icon to be real.
Whether that is enough to hand on, I don’t yet know.
Neither does my son.
Neither, for that matter, did my father.
Bibliography
Deloria, Vine, Jr. Custer Died for Your Sins: An Indian Manifesto. New York: Macmillan, 1969.
Douglas, Kelly Brown. Stand Your Ground: Black Bodies and the Justice of God. Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 2015.
Dunbar-Ortiz, Roxanne. Loaded: A Disarming History of the Second Amendment. San Francisco: City Lights Books, 2018.
Estes, Nick. Our History Is the Future: Standing Rock Versus the Dakota Access Pipeline, and the Long Tradition of Indigenous Resistance. New York: Verso, 2019.
Favreau, Jon, creator. The Mandalorian. Seasons 1–3. Disney+, 2019–2023.
Gladwell, Malcolm. Revisionist History. Season 8. 2023. Podcast.
Hauerwas, Stanley. The Peaceable Kingdom: A Primer in Christian Ethics. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983.
Hauerwas, Stanley, and William H. Willimon. Resident Aliens: Life in the Christian Colony. Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1989.
Illing, Sean, and Tyler Austin Harper. “You’re Right to Bear Arms.” The Gray Area. February 2026. Podcast.
Jennings, Willie James. “Where Violence Lives: Notes for a Pedagogy of Aftermath.” Religious Education 110, no. 4 (2015): 375–380.
Obama, Barack. Remarks at White House press briefing. July 19, 2013.
Open Range. Directed by Kevin Costner. Touchstone Pictures, 2003.
Slotkin, Richard. Regeneration Through Violence: The Mythology of the American Frontier, 1600–1860. Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1973.
———. The Fatal Environment: The Myth of the Frontier in the Age of Industrialization, 1800–1890. New York: Atheneum, 1985.
———. Gunfighter Nation: The Myth of the Frontier in Twentieth-Century America. New York: Atheneum, 1992.
Wells, Ida B. Southern Horrors: Lynch Law in All Its Phases. New York: New York Age Print, 1892.
Footnotes
Willie James Jennings, “Where Violence Lives: Notes for a Pedagogy of Aftermath,” Religious Education 110:4 (2015), 376. The full passage: “And guns are beautiful. We who have angled our lives to teach, preach, and write against violence often fail to recognize the aesthetic and community forming power of weapons in general and guns in particular. Guns are formed at the highest level of craft, creativity, engineering, and technology and they hold unrelenting seductive power.” This is not a concession to the mythology. It is a demand for honesty about what we are actually dealing with—which is a precondition for dealing with it at all.↩
Jennings, “Where Violence Lives,” 376. The full passage on the trinity: “The father, the son, and the gun—here is a trinity as formative of life together as the original.”↩
Jennings, “Where Violence Lives,” 376. On the colonial formation: “From the very beginning of the colonial moment, gun culture formed within dreams of masculinity bound to land ownership… Thus masculine subjectivity formed in the new world within a dual possessive gesture—this is my land and this is my gun.”↩
Kelly Brown Douglas, Stand Your Ground: Black Bodies and the Justice of God (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 2015), especially chapters 1–2. Douglas traces the Anglo-Saxon myth from Tacitus through English Protestant theology through American exceptionalism with the rigor of a scholar and the urgency of a mother. She is explicit that this is not a peripheral story about fringe ideology but the constitutive mythology of mainstream American self-understanding.↩
Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, Loaded: A Disarming History of the Second Amendment (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 2018). Dunbar-Ortiz’s argument is the necessary complement to Douglas’s —where Douglas traces the ideological formation of Anglo-Saxon exceptionalism, Dunbar-Ortiz traces its operational deployment against specific peoples. The Second Amendment’s original function, she argues, was not individual liberty but collective violence: enabling the slave patrols that enforced the racial order in the South, and enabling the frontier militias that prosecuted the wars of Indigenous dispossession in the West. The frontier hero of the mythology is, in historical fact, a soldier in a war of extermination. The romanticism of the Western genre is inseparable from that erasure. For the Indigenous account of what the frontier actually was—told from inside the experience of dispossession rather than from outside it—see also Vine Deloria Jr., Custer Died for Your Sins: An Indian Manifesto (New York: Macmillan, 1969), the foundational text of Indigenous critique of the very mythology this essay is analyzing; and Nick Estes, Our History Is the Future: Standing Rock Versus the Dakota Access Pipeline, and the Long Tradition of Indigenous Resistance (New York: Verso, 2019), which places that critique in direct continuity with contemporary Indigenous resistance.↩
Richard Slotkin, Regeneration Through Violence: The Mythology of the American Frontier, 1600–1860 (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1973); The Fatal Environment: The Myth of the Frontier in the Age of Industrialization, 1800–1890 (New York: Atheneum, 1985); Gunfighter Nation: The Myth of the Frontier in Twentieth-Century America (New York: Atheneum, 1992). Slotkin’s trilogy is the scholarly foundation under everything in this section—Gladwell is essentially popularizing what Slotkin documented exhaustively across three decades of research.↩
Malcolm Gladwell, Revisionist History, Season 8 (2023), “Getting Out of Dodge” and related episodes. The historical research on Dodge City is striking enough on its own, but what Gladwell’s episode forces into view is the Heller problem—see the following footnote.↩
Scalia’s majority opinion in Heller—District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008)—is a bravura piece of originalist reasoning, and if you love Supreme Court opinions the way some people love a particularly aggressive chess game, it’s genuinely fun to read. Scalia marshals colonial-era dictionaries, militia statutes, English common law, and a parade of founding-era sources with the confidence of a man who has decided in advance what the history says and is now proving it. His central move is to establish that “keep and bear arms” in the Second Amendment refers to individual self-defense rather than collective militia service—that “bear arms” was ordinary usage for carrying weapons personally, not a technical term of military art. Stevens’s dissent is equally fun and considerably more persuasive, marshaling many of the same sources to argue that every single piece of Scalia’s evidence, read in context, points toward the militia interpretation. Two brilliant lawyers, same founding-era record, opposite conclusions. This is either a sign that originalism is a sophisticated jurisprudential method or that it is sophisticated enough to reach any conclusion its practitioner prefers, depending on your priors. What neither opinion does is examine where the majority of its historical intuitions about guns and the American tradition actually came from. The founding-era sources are cited; the intervening two centuries of mythology are not. The Gunsmoke Dodge City—in which gun control is weakness and the armed individual is civilization’s last line—is the water the opinion swims in, invisible precisely because it is everywhere. Scalia was not drawing on the historical West. He was drawing on the West as it had been transmitted to him, to his clerks, to the legal culture that produced the briefs and arguments, through seventy years of television and film and political mythology. The historical record was being read through a lens the opinion didn’t know it was wearing. This is not an argument about the right outcome in Heller—that’s a different essay. It’s an observation about formation: you can be a rigorous textualist and still be, underneath the rigor, a man who watched Gunsmoke. The methodology doesn’t immunize you against the mythology. Nothing does, entirely. That’s the point.↩
Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President on Trayvon Martin,” James S. Brady Press Briefing Room, The White House, July 19, 2013, 1:33 P.M. EDT. Full transcript available at obamawhitehouse.archives.gov. The remarks came six days after George Zimmerman’s acquittal on July 13, 2013, in the killing of Trayvon Martin in Sanford, Florida, on February 26, 2012. Obama’s question is not rhetorical decoration — it is the mythology’s internal contradiction made visible: the doctrine was designed for a specific body, and the question simply asks it to account for a different one.↩
Douglas, Stand Your Ground, 87–120. Douglas’s meditation on Obama’s question as a mother runs throughout the chapter. The question’s power is that it doesn’t require a lengthy argument—it simply asks the mythology to account for itself, and the mythology cannot.↩
Ida B. Wells, Southern Horrors: Lynch Law in All Its Phases (New York: New York Age Print, 1892), “Self-Help.” The pamphlet is organized by titled sections rather than page numbers, and the Winchester passage opens the “Self-Help” section, the pamphlet’s final movement. Wells is not advocating violence as such but making a precise accounting of what remains available when legal remedy has been systematically foreclosed. The distinction matters.↩
Alex Pretti, 37, an ICU nurse and lawful gun owner with a Minnesota permit to carry, was shot and killed by federal immigration enforcement agents — a Border Patrol agent and a Customs and Border Protection officer — near the intersection of Nicollet Avenue and 26th Street in Minneapolis on January 24, 2026, during Operation Metro Surge. Forensic audio analysis confirmed ten shots fired in under five seconds. See: Liz Navratil, “Report: Border Patrol agent yelled ‘He’s got a gun!’ before Alex Pretti was killed,” Minnesota Star Tribune, January 27, 2026; “A minute-by-minute timeline of the fatal shooting of Alex Pretti involving federal agents,” ABC News, January 25, 2026; and the preliminary CBP report to Congress, January 27, 2026. That it was Border Patrol specifically is not incidental. Border Patrol is the frontier mythology made institutional — the armed man stationed at the threshold between civilization and the threatening outside, standing the ground the myth always said needed standing. The agency was created to police a border, which is to say a boundary, which is to say the exact liminal space the Western hero has always occupied: the man at the edge of the known world, deciding who may pass. That this institutionalized embodiment of the frontier myth shot a legally armed Black man at a domestic protest is the essay’s argument compressed into a single event. The mythology always knew whose body belonged on which side of the line.↩
Sean Illing and Tyler Austin Harper, “You’re Right to Bear Arms,” The Gray Area podcast, February 2026. Harper’s analysis of what the Pretti case reveals about the tribal rather than principled nature of gun rights advocacy is the clearest account I’ve encountered of how the Second Amendment functions as administered rather than as written—not a universal right but a right whose exercise is quietly conditioned on the body exercising it.↩
Stanley Hauerwas and William H. Willimon, Resident Aliens: Life in the Christian Colony (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1989). This is the most accessible entry point into the argument that reshaped my theological imagination — the claim that the church is not a chaplain to the culture but an alternative community formed by a different story, and that the political implications of the resurrection are not incidental to Christian faith but central to it. Hauerwas’s more systematic treatment of nonviolence is in The Peaceable Kingdom: A Primer in Christian Ethics (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983). The argument is not pacifism as mere policy preference but pacifism as witness — the claim that the church’s refusal of violence is intelligible only within the story that makes the resurrection the definitive word on what power actually looks like.↩
Jon Favreau, creator, The Mandalorian, seasons 1–3 (Disney+, 2019–2023). The show is conscious of its relationship to the Western genre in ways that reward attention — the lone gunfighter, the frontier setting, the code of honor, the reluctant use of violence in service of the innocent. What it adds to the tradition, and what makes it worth watching alongside a ten-year-old who wants Nerf guns, is its willingness to let the code be insufficient. Din Djarin does not transcend the mythology. He is undone by love within it, and the tension between the two never fully resolves. That honesty is rarer than it looks.↩